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Intuitions
Critical Notice of Intuitions, Anthony Booth & Darrell
Rowboom (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2014)
James Andow
Intuitions is presented as a counterpart of Rethinking Intuition (DePaul and Ramsey,
1998). Aer 16 years, it revisits the topic of the place of intuitions in philosophy in
light of two developments:
[T]he rise. . . of analytic metaphysics and of a school of philosophy that
rejects both the preoccupation with ordinary language and the idea that
the default methodology of philosophy is conceptual analysis. . .
[T]he nascent challenge from the cognitive psychologists has matured and
evolved into a fully-edged sub-discipline of philosophy, with its own jour-
nal1. . . Experimental Philosophy (Booth, 2014, 2)
I’ve focused my comments on two themes related to these two developments. In §1,
I consider the extent to which the chapters represent a shi away from the assumption
that intuitions and concepts play a central role in the epistemology of philosophy. In
§2, I consider how experimental philosophy is best understood vs how it is represented
in Intuitions.
Is Intuitions a good counterpart to Rethinking Intuition? Would I recommend it as
the basis for a graduate class or reading group? Would I direct someone to it if they
needed to catch up on the literature since DePaul & Ramsey? Yes, I would, albeit with
some reservations which I’ll explain in §2.2
1is comment is odd as experimental philosophy does not have its own journal. e only plausi-
ble candidates are Review of Philosophy and Psychology (formerly European Review of Philosophy) and
Philosophical Psychology, but both predate experimental philosophy and many issues of each contain no
experimental philosophy.
2Readers should perhaps note that Intuitions has been some time in the making (a number of chap-
ters have been available since 2009). is does aect the importance of the contribution some chapters
make to the literature. Given the delay, it is also a shame that there is almost no interaction between
chapters.
1
1 Concepts in Intuitions
It might seem as if there has been a general shi away from certain ‘old assumptions’
about philosophical methodology. Booth presents Intuitions as occurring in the midst
of shi away from one of the central concerns of Rethinking Intuition, that of concepts,
conceptual analysis, and so on. Other chapters, e.g., by Cappelen’s chapter, seem to
represent a related shi away from thinking that intuitions are central part of philoso-
phers’ methodology.
I am tempted to think, however, that any shi which has happened has been a shi
in terminology rather than a shi in assumptions about methodology. Two chapters
in Intuitions prompted this thought: Lowe’s, and Johnson and Nado’s. Let me address
them in turn.
Lowe tackles a similar task to Bealer (1998, 2002): to say something about how philo-
sophical knowledge is possible. Prima facie their stories are radically dierent, as while
Bealer hardly talks about anything other than concepts and intuitions, Lowe makes an
eort to distance himself from any such talk. However, it strikes me that it is really
only at rst glance that Bealer and Lowe’s stories are dramatically dierent.3
Lowe argues rational beings are capable of metaphysical knowledge because they
are capable of grasping the essences of at least some mind-independent entities.
. . . an entity’s essence is captured by an account of what that entity is,
or what it is (or would be) to be that entity. . . by a so-called ‘real deni-
tion’. . . [this] is not, however, to be construed simply in terms of the pos-
session or mastery of a certain concept. . .Concepts. . .may or may not be
adequate to the real natures. . . of the things being thought of. (Lowe, 2014,
256).
How could we grasp these essences—these ‘real denitions’?
A real denition. . . is just a proposition of a special kind and, hence, the
claim that we can understand at least some real denitions is no more
problematic than the more general claim, which is surely incontestable,
that we can, at least sometimes, understand propositions. (Lowe, 2014,
266) (emphasis removed)
So in other words, grasping a real denition looks a lot like Bealer’s talk of determi-
nate possession of a concept (which one has when one possesses a concept without
3ere may be reason to think Lowe would have some sympathies with my comments. Lowe (2012,
n3) says his criticisms don’t apply to Bealer’s ‘highly sophisticated theory of. . . rational intuitions’ (re-
ferring to Bealer, 2002) (but doesn’t discuss Bealer’s views further citing space limitations).
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misunderstanding or incomplete understanding) (Bealer, 1996, 12).4
Johnson and Nado (2014) (J&N) discuss moderate intuitionism – the position that
intuitions, though frequently led astray, somehow can’t fail to be generally reliable.
It is an aractive and widely endorsed position among philosophers, but lacks much
of a theoretical underpinning. J&N aempt to nd a theory which would explain the
‘fragile connection to the truth’ that such a position claims for intuitions. J&N begin
their quest as follows:
A plausible place to start looking. . . is in language. Our tendency to assume
that intuition must be generally reliable seems linked to the fact that it is
impossible for our intuitions about the meanings of words to be uerly
wrong. It’s not at all plausible to suppose, for example, that ‘dog’ might in
fact refer to cats. (Johnson and Nado, 2014, 68–69)
I thought a more natural starting point would be concepts since intuitions are a mental
phenomenon (not linguistic). In fact, J&N agree. It is just that their survey of extant
aempts to explain the reliability of intuitions in terms of a constitutive link with
concepts leads them to set the conceptual route aside and explore a metasemantic route.
I suggest that, in fact, the explanation they try to provide could be provided in terms
of an account of concepts. (I’ll go on to suggest that their strategy faces problems
whether it is parsed in terms of concepts or metasemantics.)
What do J&N nd unsatisfactory about the extant aempts to explain the reliability
of intuitions in terms of concepts?
J&N rst consider Goldman (2007). Goldman’s approach suggests that intuitions
are reliable because of our concepts in the following way: part of what it is to have
a certain concept is to have certain classicatory dispositions (Goldman, 2007, 15).
What is wrong with Goldman’s approach? e concepts Goldman is thinking about
are concepts ‘as they exist in the subject’s head’. A concept of X, in this sense, is the
kind of thing whose application conditions could depart signicantly/radically from
the facts about which things are actually Xs. So, the problem is that Goldman can give
no guarantee that intuitions provide reliable evidence about anything other than what
is in an individual’s head.
Next J&N consider Bealer (1996, 2000). As I mentioned above, Bealer appeals to de-
terminate concept possession which gives one’s judgments about the concept a ‘strong
modal tie’ to the truth. As Bealer puts it, ‘it is constitutive of determinate concept pos-
session that intuitions involving the concept (tend to) be true’ (Bealer, 1996, 12). What’s
4Another similarity is that, I think, both oer only an ‘in principle’ defence of metaphysical knowl-
edge. Lowe’s claim is that there is no in principle barrier to grasping real denitions because they are
just like any other proposition. Lowe does sometimes suggest a slightly more substantive position, e.g.,
he says if we never grasped real denitions, ‘we could never know anything at all’ (Lowe, 2014, 265)
But there is no easy inference of this kind to be had from a lack of metaphysical knowledge of essences
to a lack of any knowledge.
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the problem here? ere’s just no obvious reason to think that we oen achieve de-
terminate concept possession (i.e., possess concepts without misunderstanding or in-
complete understanding). Indeed, Bealer doesn’t argue otherwise.
So, J&N opt for a route which doesn’t appeal to concepts. ey appeal to the follow-
ing metasemantic story (my reconstruction):
(a) For all linguistic expressions, a linguistic expression E means some object, prop-
erty, kind, relation, etc. X, in the mouth of speaker S i S would be disposed to
apply E to X if S had all relevant information.5
(b) It is the righthand side of (a) which is important (does the grounding, is the
more explanatory fundamental, or similar – J&N put the point various ways in
the chapter).
How is this supposed to help J&N give the explanation they are looking for? J&N’s
basic idea is (i) our terms correctly apply to cases i we are disposed (given full in-
formation) to apply the relevant terms to the relevant cases, and (ii) our intuitions
concerning things like hypothetical cases and thought experiments are reliable but
fallible indicators of such dispositions and thus reliable.
I suggest that J&N’s apparent move away from talk of concepts is prey non-substantive.
J&N could replace their metasemantic (a) with this concept-based (ac):
(ac) For all concepts, a concept C employed by an individual S picks out an object,
property, kind, relation, etc., X, i S would be disposed to apply C to X if S had
all relevant information.
is could give J&N the same basic explanatory basis for moderate intuitionism: our
concepts correctly apply to cases i we are disposed (given full information) to apply
the relevant concepts to the relevant cases; our intuitions in response to prompts are
reliable but fallible indicators of such dispositions and thus reliable.
Moreover the relevant account of concepts has some prima facie plausibility. It
seems to have sensible things to say about what is it to have a particular concept:
it is to have a concept C and be such that were you in possession of complete infor-
mation you would have certain dispositions concerning your classication of things as
falling within the extension of C. Two parties might currently have the same concept
of knowledge but signicantly dierent dispositions concerning what they consider
to be cases of knowledge (they might too have dierent concepts despite having the
5Two notes here: (1) Sometimes J&N put this in terms of all relevant information but this variation
is not important since ‘relevant information’ means ‘items of information I such that, were S to be
apprised of I, that would inuence S’s dispositions to apply E’ (Johnson and Nado, 2014, 81). (2) J&N’s
metasemantic account has some interesting similarities to temporal externalism (see Jackman, 1999,
2005) which says ‘the future behavior of an individual or his society can aect the content of his thoughts
and uerances’ (Jackman, 1999, 160). (For discussion, see Brown 2000; Stoneham 2003).
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same dispositions). ey might also have dierent ideas about knowledge, prototypes,
theories of knowledge, and so on.
is concept-based story also promises to escape the traps which befell Goldman
and Bealer’s stories. My intuition that X knows that p is true just in case X and p stand
in the relation that my concept of knowledge picks out. My concept of knowledge is
constituted by my dispositions (given full information) to judge what falls within the
extension of my concept. Intuitions are reliable indicators of these dispositions and so
tend to be true.
However, whether told in terms of metasemantics or concepts, J&N’s story is prob-
lematic. ere are two worries which need to be addressed before either account can
help underpin moderate intuitionism. (1) It is unclear that individuals have determi-
nate dispositions given complete information. It seems that S’s dispositions given complete
information may not x a single set of dispositions. ere is no obvious reason to think
I would be disposed to respond in the same way to receiving complete information
in order {i1, i2, i3 . . . in} and {i9, i7, i3 . . .}. So it seems, according to these accounts,
many (perhaps all) of my terms/concepts have indeterminate meanings/contents. I’m
not sure we should be happy with that. (2) On either story, it needs to be that intu-
itions provide reliable evidence concerning our dispositions given complete informa-
tion. But, this reliability is far from guaranteed. Perhaps all our language resembles
the case of ‘phlogiston’. Perhaps given full information our entire conceptual frame-
work would be overhauled to the extent that every single concept in our current stock
was abandoned. ere’s no in principle reason on oer to think our second-order dis-
positions aren’t such that complete information would radically alter our rst-order
dispositions. So, it seems to be on the cards that our intuitions are currently very
unreliable.
Without a response to these worries a J&N-style story, whether told in terms of
metasemantics or intuitions, cannot succeed. According to either version of the story
we have direct evidence about current rst-order dispositions but there is no guarantee
these resemble the dispositions given full information which provide the constitutive
link with the truth conditions for our intuitions and which therefore would guarantee
the reliability of intuitions. Some such connection needs to be provided before any
such dispositional account can succeed (whether about concepts or metasemantics).6
6For the conceptual route, help might be found in an approach which J&N overlook, that of Jenkins
2008, 2014. Jenkins seems provide exactly the right sort of connection to hook something like Goldman’s
concepts up to the world (in terms of the success/usefulness of certain concepts). More interaction
between chapters would have been good here. Jenkins 2008 takes up this approach in her chapter
which directly follows J&N’s and which explicitly talks about her 2008 account as being able to avoid
the problem which Goldman (2007)’s account faces.
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2 Experimental Philosophy in Intuitions
Here I make some comments about how experimental philosophy is best understood.
First, I highlight a couple of reservations I have about how experimental philosophy
is presented in the volume. Second, I outline some of the important contributions I
think the volume does make to our understanding of the negative programme in ex-
perimental philosophy. ird, when I discuss Cappelen’s contribution, I’ll outline how
I think experimental philosophy is best understood (in general, not just the negative
programme).
2.1 Reservations
My reservations about the presentation of experimental philosophy in the volume be-
gin in the introduction. Booth’s introduction presents experimental philosophy as
growing out of the critique of analytic methods, made by some in the 1990s, on the
basis of certain psychological ndings. I understand why Booth presents experimental
philosophy in this way. Unsurprisingly, given the focus of the volume, the discussion
of experimental philosophy in the volume almost exclusively concerns experimental
philosophy’s negative programme. ‘e negative programme’ is a name given to those
elements in experimental philosophy which aim to challenge traditional philosophi-
cal methods including use of intuitions. However, this presentation of experimental
philosophy introduces a risk that anyone not already familiar will walk away from
Intuitions with a mistaken understanding of experimental philosophy. Why? Because
(a) the vast majority of current experimental philosophy is not part of any ‘negative
programme’ and (b) the work which is not in the negative programme is not helpfully
presented as growing out of the 1990s critique.
I also had some reservations about how the negative programme itself is presented
in the volume. Here’s the primary version of the empirical challenge to the use of intu-
itions in philosophy with which I am familiar. Stage one involves using evidence that
folk intuitions vary with irrelevant factors to argue that intuitions are less reliable than
we typically assume in philosophy. Stage two involves replying to typical responses.
Notably, these responses include the idea that somehow philosophers’ intuitions might
be immune to such variation. e reply to this response has two prongs: one involves
arguing that the burden of proof is on the friend of philosophers’ intuitions to demon-
strate this supposed dierence; the other involves going out and demonstrating that
philosophers’ intuitions are actually subject to many of the same problematic eects.
is, or something similar, is the version of the empirical challenge which I think you
must engage with if you want to take the challenge seriously. However, some of the
chapters in the volume discuss rather dierent challenges.
For one example, Van Roojen considers a challenge which argues we shouldn’t use
moral intuitions on the basis of evidence that they are somewhat unreliable. Van Roo-
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jen’s objection to this challenge is prey good (I won’t get into details). However, I
worry that by focusing solely on such a version of the challenge, Van Roojen risks
strawmanning the negative programme. Respectable versions of the empirical chal-
lenge argue that intuitions are not as reliable as philosophers typically take them to be
and advocate restricting their use. In relation to such versions, Van Roojen’s position
amounts to a complete concession rather than a defence, as he is okay with a retreat
to the idea that intuitions are marginally more than 50% reliable.7 (If there were an
in principle reason to think intuitions must be more than 50% reliable, then Van Roo-
jen’s defence might get more traction. He oers none. is is a point where greater
interaction between chapters might have been helpful since something of this kind is
precisely what Johnson and Nado aempt to provide in their chapter.)
For another example, Pritchard considers a version of the challenge which focuses
on mismatches between the intuitions to which philosophers appeal in the literature
and those of philosophical novices (and which assumes such mismatches to show the
former to be unreliable). Because Pritchard doesn’t specify the target he has in mind,
it is dicult to evaluate the value of his argument (he does mention Nichols et al. 2003
and Swain et al. 2008 but charitable interpretation suggests that he can’t intend to
aribute the argument he discusses to them). I’ll stick my neck out, however, and say
the argument Pritchard discusses is simply not the argument that anyone involved in
the negative programme focuses on. So, Pritchard’s chapter risks giving the unfamiliar
a skewed picture of the state of play.8
A dierent way in which some of the chapters in Intuitions failed, to my mind, to
capture the nature of the argument of the negative programme was that they fail to
acknowledge—in a way which threatens the relevance of the their arguments—the con-
siderable extant body of work concerning the expertise defence of intuitions (to which
I’ve contributed, Andow forthcominga). Two chapters in particular struck me as hav-
ing this problem. First, Sorenson advances a version of the expertise defence, but, his
objection is not novel and he doesn’t acknowledge any of the many previous aempts
to mount such a defence (notably, e.g., Williamson, 2007, 2011). Moreover, whether
an expertise defence of some kind is plausible has been thrashed out in the method-
ological literature in recent years, and draws on established literatures on expertise.
Yet, Sorenson’s chapter shows next to no awareness of this. As a result, it risks giving
7Note also, Van Roojen’s ‘defence’ of intuitions really serves to render intuition-use immune from
empirical critique. Since experiments can’t demonstrate that intuitions about the truth/falsity of a par-
ticular claim are less than 50% reliable without some independent way to check the answer. And, part of
the reason moral intuitionism was an aractive position in the rst place was that it is far from obvious
that we have any such resource—pace discussion in Andow (forthcominga).
8e chapter also contains unsupported claims about naı¨ve intuitions about certain premises in ar-
guments for scepticism. ere is limited data on such intuitions, and Pritchard cites none, but what
exists suggests they are much more ambiguous than he assumes (Adleberg et al., forthcoming; Buck-
walter and Stich 2014; Nichols et al., 2003; Seyedsayamdost, forthcoming).
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newcomers a skewed view of the state of the literature. Second, Pritchard urges that
experimental philosophers interested in challenging the use of intuitions in philoso-
phy should focus on challenging the assumption that philosophical training improves
(rather than simply changes) philosopher intuitions or some relevant skill set required
to have good intuitions. is too will strike those familiar with the literature as being
a lile strange. Since, experimental philosophers have long been doing what Pritchard
recommends. e reason for disconnect with the literature may simply be the length of
time Intuitions has been in press. Nonetheless, I urge that all newcomers interested in
issues relating to intuitions, experimental philosophy and expertise start with Nado’s
excellent Philosophy Compass piece instead (Nado 2014).
2.2 Advances in Understanding the Negative Programme
Some work in Intuitions does advances our understanding of experimental philoso-
phy’s negative programme. Here are two examples:
Ichikawa distinguishes two distinct types of empirical challenge to intuition-use.
One is the same basic challenge I outlined above: it starts with evidence that what
intuitions one has depends on certain irrelevant factors and concludes that intuitions
are less reliable than we oen give them credit. e other starts with evidence that
what intuitions one has depends on certain irrelevant factors and concludes that what
intuitions we have is troublingly arbitrary. He calls the rst the defeater critique (it
is prompted by evidence of intrapersonal variation) and the second the arbitrariness
critique (it is prompted by evidence of interpersonal variation). Ichikawa correctly
points out that most extant discussion does not focus on the arbitrariness critique.
However, it was an important part of the rhetoric in the early days of experimental
philosophy and so is worth discussing (and Ichikawa’s discussion is illuminating).9
Weinberg & Alexander (W&A) consider the wrong type of intuitions response to the
rst stage of the negative programme and argue that (i) philosophers who conceive
of intuitions in certain ‘thick’ ways might well be vindicated in claiming that the data
from experimental philosophy doesn’t threaten philosophers’ reliance on intuitions on
the grounds that the data don’t concern intuitions in the relevant sense; but (ii) conceiv-
ing of intuitions in such a thick way means that one faces a bunch of other method-
ological concerns which threaten philosophers’ reliance on intuitions. In other words,
relying on a thick characterization of intuition in order to resist the empirical threat
to intuition-use risks a pyrrhic victory.
I largely agree with most of what W&A say.10 However, in at least one respect, I
9It would have been good, however, to see recognition that the evidence base for the arbitrariness
critique now looks considerably less worrying than it once did, see, e.g., (Adleberg et al., forthcoming;
Nagel et al. 2013; Seyedsayamdost, forthcoming) – I suspect the absence of this is due to the length of
time Intuitions was in press but it is unfortunate nonetheless.
10I have wrien about W&A’s paper elsewhere and make use of some of their observations (Andow,
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think the defender of intuitions can get away with more than W&A suggest. W&A
suggest that a defender of intuitions’ conception of intuitions really needs to pass a
manifestability condition: one needs to be able to identify intuitions so-conceived (be-
cause a defender of intuitions has a problem if they conceive of intuitions in such a way
that they can’t distinguish good practice from bad – if they can’t tell when philoso-
phers are relying on intuitions). But, W&A understand the manifestability condition
as being passed only if at the time of intuiting philosophers can tell, introspectively
and from the armchair, whether their own ‘intuitions’ are genuinely intuitions of the
right sort—this is too strict. Failing the manifestability condition so-understood isn’t
necessarily a problem for the defender of intuitions. It would be a problem if they
were absolutely wedded to a practice in which philosophers work individually, from
the armchair, introspectively, and without tolerance for revisiting their thinking at a
later date. But it seems doubtful any defender of intuitions is wedded to this prac-
tice. W&A do make the point that defenders of intuition are generally interested in
defending the current practice of relying on intuition rather than relying on intuitions
simpliciter.11 However, I am inclined to think that, even insofar as the defender of in-
tuitions is absolutely wedded to defending current philosophical practice, they are not
wedded to so insular a practice.
So I recommend that W&A relax their understanding of the manifestability condi-
tion along the following lines: a conception of intuition satises manifestability if there
are available means by which intuition-using philosophers can in practice (rather than
simply theoretically), and not necessarily as individuals, reliably detect whether some-
thing is an intuition so-conceived. is relaxation has to be preferable as it would be
no big problem if, for instance, a fair number of ‘intuitions’ were only discovered to be
non-intuitions aer some back and forth in the philosophical literature and perhaps
some empirical inquiry. It is far from obvious that philosophers need to be able to tell
introspectively in the moment whether their own intuition is really an intuition (pace
considerations raised in Andow 2015b).
2.3 φ-ing and ψ-ing
Another question raised in the volume is to what extent experimental philosophy is
premised on the idea that philosophers use intuitions at all. is work (a) is valuable
and helps advance our understanding of experimental philosophy, (b) unfortunately
provides another example of how discussion of experimental philosophy oen mis-
construes what it is all about. In the following, I address both these points.
2015b).
11ey also claim the current practice condition they consider does no heavy liing, but I think that
assumptions about current practice are built into how they understand manifestability: one needs to be
able to identify intuitions so-conceived in the course of doing philosophy as it is currently done.
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In the years since Rethinking Intuitions, an important trend has been for metaphilosophers
to question the orthodox view that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Some ar-
gue this has repercussions for experimental philosophy. For example, Cappelen (2012)
argues experimental philosophy is a big mistake.12 His argument goes something like
this:
1. Experimental philosophy only has something to contribute to philosophy if philoso-
phers use intuitions as evidence.
2. Philosophers don’t use intuitions as evidence.
3. So, experimental philosophy has nothing to contribute to philosophy.
Ichikawa’s chapter says some illuminating things about experimental philosophy
in light of challenges such as Cappelen’s. Ichikawa raises interesting questions about
the nature of the negative programme in experimental philosophy. Ichikawa consid-
ers whether the two critiques he distinguished (see above) might weather such chal-
lenges. Ichikawa, I think rightly, thinks the defeater critique is not premised on the
idea philosophers use intuitions as evidence, and so can resist this type of criticism.
However, this time I think incorrectly, Ichikawa thinks that the arbitrariness critique
can’t make a similar move.
Why think the arbitrariness critique couldn’t weather this criticism? Suppose two
groups have dierent intuitions about knowledge. Suppose they do some epistemol-
ogy. Suppose their having dierent intuitions has no eect on their theory choice. In
that case, neither group need worry about the arbitrariness of their ideas about knowl-
edge. However, what this illustrates is merely that the arbitrariness critique depends
on the idea that intuitions aect philosophers’ theory choice. is idea isn’t the same
as philosophers use intuitions as evidence. e causal claim is compatible with denying
that either group uses intuitions as evidence.13 Consequently I think, contra Ichikawa,
that the arbitrariness critique can get traction whether or not philosophers actually use
intuitions as evidence (because, the idea that philosophers’ theorising isn’t aected by
what they nd intuitive is prey far-fetched). Nonetheless, Ichikawa’s discussion of
these issues is interesting and deserves to be given further aention.
Another chapter which takes up a similar theme is Cappelen’s own contribution
which defends his initial argument (above) against objections of the following form:
1. Even if philosophers don’t use intuitions as evidence, they do use X (and that’s
what we meant all along by ‘intuitions’).
12Although this criticism is made prominently by Cappelen (2012) it has been made by others too
and needn’t be made on the same grounds as Cappelen.
13Ichikawa focuses on the presentation of the arbitrariness critique in Weinberg et al. (2001); these
same authors put their argument s in explicitly causal terms in Nichols et al. (2003).
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2. Experimental philosophy investigates X, so can (i) provide evidence in the form
of X, and (ii) undermine some extant appeals to X (by showing that they are
sensitive to irrelevant factors).
3. So, it isn’t true that experimental philosophy only has something to contribute
to philosophy if philosophers use intuitions as evidence.
In essence, the objection is that experimental philosophers never put much stock in
intuition-talk anyway and they can do without it. Cappelen’s chapter argues exper-
imental philosophers can’t so easily do without intuition-talk. His strategy is to run
through various dierent ways of reinterpreting experimental philosophers’ intuition-
talk—lling in that variable X—raising objections to all of them.
Again, Cappelen’s discussion does raise interesting questions about the nature of
experimental philosophy and the details of his argument deserve to be engaged with.
Hopefully, however, I will be excused a bit more of a ‘big picture’ comment. One
might suspect I would be sympathetic to Cappelen’s position. For, like Cappelen, I
am myself tempted to think the xation on intuitions among metaphilosophers is a bit
unfortunate (see, e.g., Andow forthcomingb). However, rather than being sympathetic,
my reaction to the back-and-forth—between Cappelen (2012), critics, and Cappelen
(2014)—is that both sides buy into a problematic understanding of what experimental
philosophy is all about.
e problem is that both sides seem to accept that experimental philosophy is premised
on the idea that philosophers φ and experimental philosophy can help them φ beer.
But I don’t see things that way.14 Experimental philosophy is not premised on the idea
that philosophers commonly pursue some project which experimental philosophy can
further. e premise is not that philosophers φ and experimental philosophy can im-
prove their φing, but rather that philosophers don’t ψ but should. (Probably not all of
them should – certainly not all the time – and it mightn’t be the only thing experimen-
tal methods are good for philosophically speaking. Nonetheless, philosophers should
ψ.)
What are these projects which experimental philosophy wants to use empirical tools
to further? What is it to ψ? It is to try to make sense of the way we think about philo-
sophically interesting things like morality, freewill, and so on—how we think, not simply
what. Of course, I don’t deny that we experimental philosophers generally understand
survey responses to indicate what our participants think—participants’ ‘intuitions’ if
you like that sort of language. However, the reason we are interested in this is largely
not because philosophers use intuitions as evidence. e aim is to use careful manip-
ulation to get a beer understanding of how participants think—their cognitive archi-
tecture, their ways of understanding the world, their ways of coming to think what
14Read my published work and you perhaps wouldn’t guess. I’ve oen wrien as though I thought
this was the case too. However, I’ve always been prey clear deep down.
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they think.
Don’t believe me? Read the website!
. . . experimental philosophers actually go out and run systematic experi-
ments aimed at understanding how people ordinarily think about the is-
sues at the foundations of philosophical discussions.15
Many philosophers will be asking at this point, ‘What next?. . .When does that con-
tribute towards some philosophical project with which I am familiar?’ And that’s
my point. Experimental philosophy isn’t valuable only insofar it furthers the projects
philosophers currently have.
Still don’t believe me? Read the manifesto! Knobe and Nichols describe a familiar
approach according to which what people think about something is considered philo-
sophically relevant only insofar as it sheds light on the thing itself (their example,
causation) and continue. . .
With the advent of experimental philosophy, this familiar approach is be-
ing turned on its head. More and more, philosophers are coming to feel
that questions about how people ordinarily think have great philosophical
signicance in their own right. . .we do not think that the signicance of
[intuitions about causation] is exhausted by the evidence they might pro-
vide for one or another metaphysical theory. On the contrary, we think
that the paerns to be found in people’s intuitions point to important truths
about how the mind works, and these truths—truths about people’s minds,
not about metaphysics—have great signicance for traditional philosoph-
ical questions. (Knobe and Nichols, 2008, 11–12) (my emphasis)
Our dissatisfaction is not that philosophers use intuitions as evidence but fail to use
appropriate tools. Our dissatisfaction is with a discipline which is largely no longer in-
terested in making sense of the ways that ordinary people think about philosophically
interesting things.
Still don’t believe me Again, read the manifesto!
It used to be a commonplace that the discipline of philosophy was deeply
concerned with questions about the human condition. Philosophers tho-
ught about human beings and how their minds worked. . .On this tradi-
tional conception, it wasn’t particularly important to keep philosophy clearly
distinct from psychology, history, or political science. . .
e new movement of experimental philosophy seeks a return to this tra-
ditional vision. Like philosophers of centuries past, we are concerned with
15is can be found at the following address (last accessed 8th Jan 2014 – my emphasis):
hp://pantheon.yale.edu/ jk762/ExperimentalPhilosophy.html.
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questions about how human beings actually happen to be. . .we think that
many of the deepest questions of philosophy can only be properly ad-
dressed by immersing oneself in the messy, contingent, highly variable
truths about how human beings really are. (Knobe and Nichols, 2008, 3)
(my emphasis)
Lile has changed since the manifesto. Here are Buckwalter and Sytsma in their
introduction to the forthcoming Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy:16
Contemporary experimental philosophers return to these ways of doing
philosophy. ey conduct controlled experiments, and empirical studies
more generally, to explore. . .how we think about those phenomena. . .is
work helps us to understand our reality, who we are as people, and the
choices we make about important philosophical maers that shape our
lives. (Buckwalter and Sytsma, forthcoming) (my emphasis)
Of course, experimental philosophers do use the word ‘intuitions’ a lot and they some-
times aempt to justify their methodology in precisely the terms that Cappelen accuses
them of doing.17 My (self-)diagnosis is that this is simply an unfortunate result of try-
ing to peddle experimental philosophy to the mainstream. Experimental philosophers
too caught the ‘verbal virus’ of intuition-talk (Cappelen, 2012, 22).
Cappelen’s chapter is laudable for its aempt to look below the surface of experi-
mental philosophers’ intuition-talk.18 And perhaps, perhaps, he is right that it doesn’t
make much sense. But this absolutely doesn’t mean that experimental philosophy is
founded on a big mistake. Once experimental philosophy is properly understood it
should be clear that Cappelen’s arguments are just o target.19
3 Wrapping up
Is Intuitions a good counterpart to Rethinking Intuition? I have some misgivings about
giving a glowing commendation with no reservations. I really think that the reader
16Buckwalter and Sytsma do emphasise that experimental philosophers sometimes aim to investigate
phenomena themselves and argue that how we think about phenomena can cast light on the phenomena
themselves—but none of this is premised on the claim that philosophers use intuitions as evidence.
17I have done it myself (Andow, 2014, 2015a,b; Roberts et al., 2014).
18It is something I do myself (Andow2015c,under review. and Andow & Roessler under review.).
19Perhaps Cappelen’s real issue with experimental philosophy concerns a disagreement about how
philosophy should be done, rather than about how it is done. Consider his sign-o: ‘Is [x-phi] a harmful
activity? My answer. . . is a tentative ‘yes’. Not only does x-phi promote a false picture of philosophy. . . it
will change philosophy’ (Cappelen, 2014, 285). Why else would it be legitimate for him to assume that
change is negative?
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risks walking away with a problematic understanding of experimental philosophy—
particularly with respect to the nature and importance of the so-called negative pro-
gramme. And I’d have rather seen certain chapters demonstrate a much greater aware-
ness of the current state of the relevant literature (e.g., Sorenson’s). Nonetheless, the
volume does collect together a number of valuable contributions to the literature, and,
although most of these have been in circulation for a while, I would have bought it had
I not received a free copy to review.
I haven’t touched on a number of chapters in the above. Let me quickly say some-
thing about them. Chudno (2014) argues that intuitions play a role in guiding action.
Sosa (2014) urges the view that ‘A proposition is intuited when the subject is aracted
to assent just through understanding it. Such. . . an intuition, is rational when it is owed
to a competence manifest in the subject’s araction to assent, one that reliably enough
discerns the true from the false’ (Sosa, 2014, 46). Pust (2014) raises objections to the
arguments of those who claim that (a) moderate rationalism—the view that ‘a person’s
having a rational intuition that p prima facie justies them in believing that p’—needs
empirical support, and (b) suitable support would ‘suce to convince empiricists to
abandon their opposition to rationalism’ (Pust, 2014, 50). Rowboom (2014), a chap-
ter on the status of thought experiments in science, introduces the idea that thought
experiments serve as argument pumps. Jenkins (2014), whose chapter did get a fa-
vorable mention above, does some great work puing names to various dierent ways
philosophers use the word ‘intuition’ and ideas they associate with it. And Turri (2014)
suggests an important amendment to the principle of charity we oen employ when
dealing with linguistic intuitions.
*
Sorenson ends his contribution with some prophesies, here are mine:
1. Methodologists will start to explore to what extent there really has been a shi
away from the idea that the default methodology of philosophy is conceptual
analysis (or whether there’s only been a shi in terminology).
2. Methodologists will continue to talk about intuitions quite a bit—there’s no real
harm in it. However, they’ll shi away from questions like ‘Are intuitions that p
used as evidence that p?’ and ‘Are intuitions that p evidence that p?’ and towards
questions about:
a) the value of making sense of how we think about philosophically interest-
ing stu, and
b) the role of intuitions in a more holistic and abductive model of philosoph-
ical enquiry.20
20Love (2013) brings this theme out in Alexander (2012) and Cappelen (2012). It is also present in
Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013). And was even present way back in DePaul & Ramsey in Cummins (1998).
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3. estions about how we think about philosophically interesting things will be
more widely conceived of as part of the proper domain of philosophy.
(Okay, this is more of a wishlist than a list of prophesies.)
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